

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

BRADLEY A. WERNER, JR.,

Plaintiff,

-against-

NEW YORK COUNTY, NYC; MYLES
ASHONG, ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY,
NEW YORK COUNTY; ALVIN BRAGG,
DISTRICT ATTORNEY; ERIC ADAMS,
MAYOR; MICHAEL WIGDOR, ASST. CHIEF
INVESTIGATOR NEW YORK COUNTY DA'S
OFFICE,

Defendants.

24-CV-4186 (LTS)

ORDER TO AMEND

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge:

Plaintiff, who currently is incarcerated at Groveland Correctional Facility, brings this action, *pro se*, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated his rights. By order dated June 3, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed *in forma pauperis* ("IFP"), that is, without prepayment of fees.¹ For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner's *in forma pauperis* complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.

¹ Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); *see Abbas v. Dixon*, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. *See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3)*.

While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe *pro se* pleadings liberally, *Harris v. Mills*, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” *Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons*, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in *pro se* cases, *id.* at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, *pro se* pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are drawn from the complaint, which names as Defendants New York City Mayor Eric Adams; New York County; the New York County District Attorney’s Office; New York County District Attorney Alvin Bragg; New York County Assistant District Attorney Myles Ashong; and New York County District Attorney Office Chief Investigator Michael Wigdor (the last four collectively referred to as the “DA Defendants”). Plaintiff alleges that he was falsely arrested on March 27, 2023, and “unlawfully remanded on another inmate[’]s charge on Rikers Island.” He also claims that he was assaulted nine times while at Rikers, but he does not say by whom. (ECF 1 ¶ V.) According to Plaintiff, an individual named Raushan Assembayeva filed a “false report incident.” (*Id.* ¶ VI.)

On December 7, 2023, a jury found Plaintiff not guilty of the “manufactured charges,” however, a “second indictment . . . happened out of ‘entrapment’” and other unlawful procedures. (*Id.*) It is unclear when exactly Plaintiff was convicted. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant District Attorney’s Office “is a hideous place shredding the fabric of American constitutional law and rights,” and that the conviction is on appeal. (*Id.*) Plaintiff seeks money damages for “308 days of illegal remanded incarceration” and to have his sentence overturned. (*Id.* ¶ VI.) Plaintiff has also filed an application for the Court to appoint *pro bono* counsel. (ECF 4.)

DISCUSSION

A. Challenge to conviction

Plaintiff seeks to have his conviction overturned. Plaintiff may not obtain such relief, however, in a Section 1983 action; instead, he can only obtain such relief by appealing the conviction and then bringing a petition for a writ of *habeas corpus*. *See Wilkinson v. Dotson*, 544 U.S. 74, 78-82 (2005) (citing *Preiser v. Rodriguez*, 411 U.S. 475 (1973)) (noting that writ of *habeas corpus* is sole remedy for prisoner seeking to challenge the fact or duration of his confinement). An individual who seeks release from state custody may do so by filing a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Section 2254 is the proper vehicle to use in challenging the constitutionality of an individual's custody, after an individual has been convicted in a state court and sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment pursuant to a judgment of conviction. *See Cook v. New York State Div. of Parole*, 321 F.3d 274, 278 (2d Cir. 2003).

The Court declines to recharacterize Plaintiff's allegations seeking release as a petition brought under Section 2254 because Plaintiff indicates that the conviction is on appeal, and thus he has not shown that he has exhausted his state court remedies. Exhaustion of state court remedies is required under Section 2254. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c);² *see Coleman v. Thompson*, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991) ("[A] state prisoner's federal *habeas* petition should be dismissed if the prisoner has not exhausted available state remedies as to any of his federal claims.").

Insofar as Plaintiff seeks to challenge his conviction, he must first exhaust his state court remedies, and if he is unsuccessful in the state courts, he may return to federal court and file a petition for a writ of *habeas corpus* under Section 2254.

² Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which modified the *habeas corpus* statutes, a person in state custody must generally file a Section 2254 petition within one year from the latest of four benchmark dates: (1) when the judgment of conviction becomes final; (2) when a government-created impediment to making such a motion is removed; (3) when the constitutional right asserted is initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if it has been made retroactively available to cases on collateral review; or (4) when the facts supporting the claim(s) could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

B. Civil rights claims for damages

1. Unlawful imprisonment

Plaintiff seeks damages for his allegedly unlawful imprisonment. When a plaintiff seeks damages for allegedly unlawful imprisonment, “the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” *Heck v. Humphrey*, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). To demonstrate a favorable termination of a criminal prosecution for purposes of claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff “need only show that his prosecution ended without a conviction.” *Thompson v. Clark*, 596 U.S. 36, 39 (2022); *see also Wilkinson v. Dotson*, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005) (“[A] state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation) – no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings) – *if* success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.”) (italics in original); *Heck*, 512 U.S. at 486-87 (“[I]n order to recover damages for [an] allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. . . .” (footnote omitted)).

Here, Plaintiff’s claim for damages for wrongful imprisonment would necessarily be inconsistent with his conviction, and he therefore cannot seek such relief unless his conviction is overturned or otherwise called into question. *Id.* at 477, n. 7 (holding that a plaintiff cannot seek relief for “the ‘injury’ of being convicted and imprisoned (until his conviction has been overturned)”). The Court dismisses, under the doctrine set forth in *Heck*, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims seeking damages for injury caused by his allegedly wrongful conviction.

2. Assault claims

Plaintiff asserts that he was assaulted nine times while at Rikers. Prison officials are required to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of prisoners, including protecting them from harm caused by other prisoners. *See Farmer v. Brennan*, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994); *Fischl v. Armitage*, 128 F.3d 50, 55 (2d Cir. 1997). A pretrial detainee asserting a failure-to-protect claim under the Due Process Clause must plead two elements: (1) an “objective” element, which requires a showing that the risk of harm is sufficiently serious, and (2) a “mental” element, which requires a showing that the officer knew or should have known of the risk of serious harm but acted with deliberate indifference to that risk. *Darnell v. Pineiro*, 849 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2017). The mere negligence of a correctional official is not a basis for a claim of a federal constitutional violation under Section 1983. *See Daniels v. Williams*, 474 U.S. 327, 335-36 (1986); *Davidson v. Cannon*, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986).

To state a claim that correction officers used excessive force, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that a correction officer engaged in an “exercise of power without any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate government objective.” *See Edrei v. Maguire*, 892 F.3d 525, 533 (2d Cir. 2018) (citation omitted); *see also Kingsley v. Hendrickson*, 576 U.S. 389, 396-97 (2015) (noting that a pretrial detainee asserting an excessive force claim must show only that the force used against him was objectively unreasonable and is not required to prove the defendant’s subjective intent, as has been required in cases involving convicted prisoners).

To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must also allege facts showing the defendants’ direct and personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation. *See Spavone v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Serv.*, 719 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2013) (“It is well settled in this Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in the alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damage under § 1983.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). A defendant may not be held liable under Section 1983 solely because that defendant employs or supervises a person who violated the plaintiff’s rights. *See Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.”). Rather, “[t]o

hold a state official liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead and prove the elements of the underlying constitutional violation directly against the official[.]” *Tangreti v. Bachmann*, 983 F.3d 609, 620 (2d Cir. 2020).

It is not clear whether Plaintiff is alleging that correction officers used excessive force against him, or that correction officers failed to protect him from assault by other detainees, or that he even seeks to bring a claim arising out of the assaults. Plaintiff provides almost no facts about the assaults, and he does not appear to name any Defendant who was personally involved in the events giving rise to the assaults. Plaintiff names Mayor Adams, but he does not allege that the mayor had any involvement in the events occurring at Rikers Island.

The Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint, should he wish to do so, to provide facts regarding the alleged assaults, to name as defendants the individuals who were personally involved in those events, and to provide facts explaining how those defendants were personally involved.

C. New York County

The Court construes Plaintiff’s claim against New York County as a claim against the City of New York. When a plaintiff sues a municipality under Section 1983, it is not enough for the plaintiff to allege that one of the municipality’s employees or agents engaged in some wrongdoing. The plaintiff must show that the municipality itself caused the violation of the plaintiff’s rights. *See Connick v. Thompson*, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (“A municipality or other local government may be liable under . . . section [1983] if the governmental body itself ‘subjects’ a person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes’ a person ‘to be subjected’ to such deprivation.” (quoting *Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.*, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978))); *Cash v. Cnty. of Erie*, 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011). In other words, to state a Section 1983 claim against a municipality, the plaintiff must allege facts showing (1) the existence of a municipal policy, custom, or practice, and (2) that the policy, custom, or practice caused the violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. *See Jones v. Town of East Haven*, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012); *Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown*, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (internal citations omitted).

A plaintiff may satisfy the policy or custom requirement by alleging one of the following: “(1) a formal policy officially endorsed by the municipality; (2) actions taken by government officials responsible for establishing the municipal policies that caused the particular deprivation in question; (3) a practice so consistent and widespread that, although not expressly authorized, constitutes a custom or usage of which a supervising policy-maker must have been aware; or (4) a failure by policymakers to provide adequate training or supervision to subordinates to such an extent that it amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of the those who come into contact with the municipal employees.” *Brandon v. City of New York*, 705 F. Supp. 2d 161, 276-77 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citations omitted).

Plaintiff provides no facts suggesting that a municipal policy, custom, or practice contributed to the assaults that allegedly violated his constitutional rights. The Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint, should he wish to do so, naming the City of New York as a defendant, and providing facts in support of a municipal liability claim against the City of New York in connection with the alleged assaults at Rikers.

D. Motion for counsel

The factors to be considered in ruling on an indigent litigant’s request for counsel include the merits of the case, Plaintiff’s efforts to obtain a lawyer, and Plaintiff’s ability to gather the facts and present the case if unassisted by counsel. *See Cooper v. A. Sargent Co.*, 877 F.2d 170, 172 (2d Cir. 1989); *Hodge v. Police Officers*, 802 F.2d 58, 60-62 (2d Cir. 1986). Of these, the merits are “[t]he factor which command[s] the most attention.” *Cooper*, 877 F.2d at 172. Because it is too early in the proceedings for the Court to assess the merits of the action, Plaintiff’s motion for counsel is denied without prejudice to renewal at a later date.

E. Supplemental jurisdiction

It is not clear whether Plaintiff seeks to assert state law claims. A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction of state law claims when it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1337(c)(3). Generally, “when the federal-law claims have dropped out

of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction.” *Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill*, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988)).

Because the Court has granted Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint, the Court will determine at a later stage whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claims Plaintiff may be asserting. *See Kolari v. New York-Presbyterian Hosp.*, 455 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Subsection (c) of § 1337 ‘confirms the discretionary nature of supplemental jurisdiction by enumerating the circumstances in which district courts can refuse its exercise.’”) (quoting *City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons*, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997)).

LEAVE TO AMEND

Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, unless amendment would be futile. *See Hill v. Curcione*, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); *Salahuddin v. Cuomo*, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a *pro se* complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” *Cuoco v. Moritsugu*, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting *Gomez v. USA Fed. Sav. Bank*, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). In light of Plaintiff’s *pro se* status, the Court grants Plaintiff 60 days’ leave to amend his complaint to detail his claims arising from the assaults that allegedly occurred on Rikers Island.

In the “Statement of Claim” section of the amended complaint form, Plaintiff must provide a short and plain statement of the relevant facts supporting each claim against each defendant. If Plaintiff does not know the name of a defendant, he may refer to that individual as “John Doe” or “Jane Doe” in both the caption and the body of the amended complaint, with a description, such as “Correction Officer John Doe #1 on duty August 31, 2023, at the Rose M. Singer Center, during the 7-3 p.m. shift.”³ If

³ The naming of John Doe defendants, however, does not toll the three-year statute of limitations period governing this action, and Plaintiff shall be responsible for ascertaining the true identity of any

Plaintiff has an address for any named defendant, Plaintiff must provide it. Plaintiff should include all of the information in the amended complaint that Plaintiff wants the Court to consider in deciding whether the amended complaint states a claim for relief. That information should include:

- a) the names and titles of all relevant people;
- b) a description of all relevant events, including what each defendant did or failed to do, the approximate date and time of each event, and the general location where each event occurred;
- c) a description of the injuries Plaintiff suffered; and
- d) the relief Plaintiff seeks, such as money damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief.

Essentially, Plaintiff's amended complaint should tell the Court: who violated his federally protected rights and how; when and where such violations occurred; and why Plaintiff is entitled to relief.

Because Plaintiff's amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the original complaint, any facts or claims that Plaintiff wants to include from the original complaint must be repeated in the amended complaint.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff's claims against the named Defendants are dismissed, and the Clerk of Court is directed to terminate them on the docket.

Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint that complies with the standards set forth above. Plaintiff must submit the amended complaint to this Court's Pro Se Intake Unit within sixty days of the date of this order, caption the document as an "Amended Complaint," and label the document with docket number 24-CV-4186 (LTS). An Amended Civil Rights Complaint form is attached to this order. No summons will issue at this time. If Plaintiff fails to comply within the time allowed, and he cannot

"John Doe" defendants and amending his complaint to include the identity of any "John Doe" defendants before the statute of limitations period expires. Should Plaintiff seek to add a new claim or party after the statute of limitations period has expired, he must meet the requirements of Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

show good cause to excuse such failure, the complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

The motion for *pro bono* counsel is denied without prejudice, and the Clerk of Court is directed to terminate it. (ECF 4.)

The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. *Cf. Coppedge v. United States*, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).

Dated: August 26, 2024
New York, New York

/s/ Laura Taylor Swain
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN
Chief United States District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

(In the space above enter the full name(s) of the plaintiff(s).)

-against-

**AMENDED
COMPLAINT**

under the Civil Rights Act,
42 U.S.C. § 1983

Jury Trial: Yes No
(check one)

____ Civ. ____ ()

(In the space above enter the full name(s) of the defendant(s). If you cannot fit the names of all of the defendants in the space provided, please write "see attached" in the space above and attach an additional sheet of paper with the full list of names. The names listed in the above caption must be identical to those contained in Part I. Addresses should not be included here.)

I. Parties in this complaint:

A. List your name, identification number, and the name and address of your current place of confinement. Do the same for any additional plaintiffs named. Attach additional sheets of paper as necessary.

Plaintiff's Name _____
ID# _____
Current Institution _____
Address _____

B. List all defendants' names, positions, places of employment, and the address where each defendant may be served. Make sure that the defendant(s) listed below are identical to those contained in the above caption. Attach additional sheets of paper as necessary.

Defendant No. 1 Name _____ Shield # _____
Where Currently Employed _____
Address _____

Defendant No. 2 Name _____ Shield # _____
 Where Currently Employed _____
 Address _____

Defendant No. 3 Name _____ Shield # _____
 Where Currently Employed _____
 Address _____

Who did what?

Defendant No. 4 Name _____ Shield # _____
 Where Currently Employed _____
 Address _____

Defendant No. 5 Name _____ Shield # _____
 Where Currently Employed _____
 Address _____

II. Statement of Claim:

State as briefly as possible the facts of your case. Describe how each of the defendants named in the caption of this complaint is involved in this action, along with the dates and locations of all relevant events. You may wish to include further details such as the names of other persons involved in the events giving rise to your claims. Do not cite any cases or statutes. If you intend to allege a number of related claims, number and set forth each claim in a separate paragraph. Attach additional sheets of paper as necessary.

A. In what institution did the events giving rise to your claim(s) occur?

B. Where in the institution did the events giving rise to your claim(s) occur?

C. What date and approximate time did the events giving rise to your claim(s) occur?

D. Facts: _____

What happened to you?

Who else
saw what
happened?

III. Injuries:

If you sustained injuries related to the events alleged above, describe them and state what medical treatment, if any, you required and received.

IV. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies:

The Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), requires that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." Administrative remedies are also known as grievance procedures.

A. Did your claim(s) arise while you were confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility?

If YES, name the jail, prison, or other correctional facility where you were confined at the time of the events giving rise to your claim(s).

B. Does the jail, prison or other correctional facility where your claim(s) arose have a grievance procedure?

Yes ____ No ____ Do Not Know ____

C. Does the grievance procedure at the jail, prison or other correctional facility where your claim(s) arose cover some or all of your claim(s)?

Yes ____ No ____ Do Not Know ____

If YES, which claim(s)?

D. Did you file a grievance in the jail, prison, or other correctional facility where your claim(s) arose?

Yes ____ No ____

If NO, did you file a grievance about the events described in this complaint at any other jail, prison, or other correctional facility?

Yes ____ No ____

E. If you did file a grievance, about the events described in this complaint, where did you file the grievance?

1. Which claim(s) in this complaint did you grieve?

2. What was the result, if any?

3. What steps, if any, did you take to appeal that decision? Describe all efforts to appeal to the highest level of the grievance process.

F. If you did not file a grievance:

1. If there are any reasons why you did not file a grievance, state them here:

2. If you did not file a grievance but informed any officials of your claim, state who you informed, when and how, and their response, if any:

G. Please set forth any additional information that is relevant to the exhaustion of your administrative remedies.

Note: You may attach as exhibits to this complaint any documents related to the exhaustion of your administrative remedies.

V. Relief:

State what you want the Court to do for you (including the amount of monetary compensation, if any, that you are seeking and the basis for such amount). _____

VI. Previous lawsuits:

A. Have you filed other lawsuits in state or federal court dealing with the same facts involved in this action?

Yes _____ No _____

B. If your answer to A is YES, describe each lawsuit by answering questions 1 through 7 below. (If there is more than one lawsuit, describe the additional lawsuits on another sheet of paper, using the same format.)

1. Parties to the previous lawsuit:

Plaintiff

Defendants

2. Court (if federal court, name the district; if state court, name the county)

3. Docket or Index number

4. Name of Judge assigned to your case

5. Approximate date of filing lawsuit

6. Is the case still pending? Yes No

If NO, give the approximate date of disposition.

7. What was the result of the case? (For example: Was the case dismissed? Was there judgment in your favor? Was the case appealed?) _____

C. Have you filed other lawsuits in state or federal court otherwise relating to your imprisonment?

D. If your answer to C is YES, describe each lawsuit by answering questions 1 through 7 below. (If there is more than one lawsuit, describe the additional lawsuits on another piece of paper, using the same format.)

1. Parties to the previous lawsuit:

Plaintiff

Defendants

2. Court (if federal court, name the district; if state court, name the county)

3. Docket or Index number

4. Name of Judge assigned to your case

5. Approximate date of filing lawsuit _____

6. Is the case still pending? Yes No
If NO, give the approximate date of disposition _____

7. What was the result of the case? (For example: Was the case dismissed? Was there judgment in your favor? Was the case appealed?)

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Signed this day of , 20 .

Signature of Plaintiff _____

Inmate Number _____

Institution Address _____

Note: All plaintiffs named in the caption of the complaint must date and sign the complaint and provide their inmate numbers and addresses.

I declare under penalty of perjury that on this day of , 20 , I am delivering this complaint to prison authorities to be mailed to the *Pro Se* Office of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.

Signature of Plaintiff: _____